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court was unconsciously influenced by the fact that the District Court
had expressly found that no discrimination of the sort alleged actually existed.
If discrimination between the assessment of real and personal
property was enough in the Ohio case, is not the alleged discrimination between assessments of properties in the same class more deserving of equitable relief ?31 Moreover, the exception in the North
Carolina statute, in favor of injunctive relief against illegal taxes,
creates no greater right to that relief than exists in jurisdictions without any such statute.3 2 The view that this statute, by virtue of that
exception, operates to increase the remedies available in the Federal
Equity Court and must therefore be ignored, is perhaps derived from
the court's willingness to make the same statute, insofar as it authorizes suits to recover taxes paid under protest, the affirmative basis
of a proceeding on the law side of the same tribunal.
Finally, even if a recovery at law of the difference between the tax
on a legal assessment and the actual amount of the tax paid under
protest, with interest, will theoretically make the complainant whole,
and even if this decision would be res judicata:as to subsequent levies
pending the next quadrennial assessment (which might be doubted in
view of the technical change in the issues and subject matter from
year to year) the relief to be awarded at law can take no notice of
the jeopardizing of the complainant's financial structure incident to
the loss of those funds during the period of suit. A jury could not
deal intelligently with the issue to be presented at law; a judge sitting
alone will have to handle the task that a court consisting of three
judges in the instant case refused to attempt. It is not believed that
the remedy at lav is adequate.
The North Carolina case is now before the Supreme Court of the
United States on a writ of certiorari. THOMAS W. SPRINKLE.
TITLE TO CORPORATE PROPERTY UPON DISSOLUTION

Smith v. Dicks' presents a question as to property rights of stockholders where, without knowledge on the part of the corporate memSee Western Union Tel. Co. v. Tax. Com., stpra note 30.
" See notes 1 to 5 supra. The court examined the state supreme court's construction of the statute and found it difficult to determine precisely when injunction against illegal taxes would be granted. It assumed, however, that the
state court would have granted that relief in the case at bar. Herietta Mills
Co. v. Rutherford County, supra note 26, at p. 573.
± 197 N. C. 355, 148 S. E. 463 (1929).
'

NOTES
bers, the charter had expired by limitation and operations had been
continued thereafter for seven years, without any move for winding
up as provided for by statute. It was held that upon expiration of
the charter, the only outstanding indebtedness being a mortgage, the
members became tenants in common of an undivided interest in fee,
subject to the mortgage indebtedness, with power of conveyance accordingly on the part of any member.
Upon the expiration or revocation of a corporate charter with
resultant dissolution, all jurisdictions in dealing with the assets, in
the final analysis, reach the same practical result-payment of corporate debts with distribution of any residue among the stockholders.
But in the matter of defining stockholders' rights, and the situs of
title, in the corporate assets during the period of dissolution, opinions
are both confusing and conflicting.2
Decisions may be roughly
grouped under three heads.
Under the so-called "trust-fund" doctrine8 the assets of a dissolved corporation constitute a trust fund for the primary benefit
of creditors, with distribution of the residue among the stockholders.
Legal title to the property vests in the trustees 4 who are provided for
by statute5 or appointed by the court, 6 the shareholders having only
an equitable interest.7 An invention of the courts of equity whereby
to defeat the old common law rules of reverter and escheat, 8 the
"trust-fund" doctrine has been continued in modern times by decis'See 8 THompsox, CoRPoRAToNs (3rd ed.), §§6505-6523;
CoRPoRATIoNs (1927), §267; note (1927) 47 A. L. R. 1288.

BALLANTINE,

'McWilliams v. Excelsior Coal Co., 298 Fed. 884 (C. C. A. 8th. 1924);
Burke v. Wall, 29 La. Anno. 38, 29 Am. Rep. 316 (1877); Roman Catholic
Church v. Texas & P. R. Co., 41 Fed. 564 (C. C. E. D. La. 1890) ; New York
B. & E. R. Co. v. Motil, 81 Conn. 466, 71 Atl. 563 (1908); note (1927) 47
A. L. R. 1288; (1921) 35 HARv. L. Rxv. 58; (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 780.
'Aalwyns Law Institute v. Martin, 173 Cal. 21, 159 Pac. 158 (1916) ; Roseboom v. Warner, 132 Il1. 81, 23 N. E. 339 (1890); Neptune Fire Engine &
Hose Co. v. Board of Education, 166 Ky. 1, 178 S. W. 1138 (1915); Thomas
v. Rogers, 191 N. C. 736, 133 S. E. 18 (1926); In re Friedman, 164 N. Y.
Supp. 892, 177 App. Div. 755 (1917).
"'Young v. Fitch, 182 Ky. 29, 206 S. W. 29 (1918) ; N. C. Con. Stat. Ann.

(1919), §1194.

'Bacon v. Robertson, supra note 3; N. C. Con. Stat. Ann. (1919), §1194.
SMorman Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1, 34 L. Ed. 478 (1889);
Richards v. Attleboro Nat. Bank, 148 Mass. 187, 19 N. E. 353, 1 L. R. A. 781
(1889) ; Muir v Citizens Nat. Bank, 39 Wash. 57, 80 Pac. 1007 (1905), holding
that an assignment or transfer of stock by a stockholder after the dissolution
of a corporation is merely an equitable assignment of his interests in the assets
of the concern as it may appear upon the settlement.
'For cases dealing with the doctrines of reverter and escheat see: Neptune
Fire Engine & Hose Co. v. Board of Education, supra note 4; Wilson v. Leary,
120 N. C. 90, 26 S. E. 30 (1897) ; Note (1927) 47 A. L. R. 1288, 1334.
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ions and statutes. Under the statutes in many states provision is
made for a period in which to wind up the corporate affairs, 9 with
stipulations for the corporate officers to act as trustees,' 0 or for
appointment of receivers,"' or for the corporation itself to act as
12
trustee.
Another view, although protecting the rights of creditors under a
trust, presents a hybrid situation so far as the interests of the stockholders are concerned, wherein the interests of stockholders are equitable, and legal title is in the trustees until debts are paid; legal title
in the residue thereafter vesting in the stockholders as tenants in common. 13 North Carolina comes under this grouping by virtue of construction of statutes and decisions; statutes provide for a three year
period of dissolution during which in the absence of court action, the
directors are trustees ;14 decisions hold that the assets of a dead corporation constitute a trust fund ;15 and the principal case 16 holds that
in the absence of corporate debts and active dissolution proceedings,
the stockholders become tenants in common.
Still other decisions bring forward the doctrine that when the
corporate existence ceases the stockholders become vested with a
legal title to its property as tenants in common, subject, of course, to

"Refer to statutes of particular states. For North Carolina see N. C. Con.
Stat. Ann. (1919), §1193, providing a 3 year period; Buckley v. Anderson et al,
137 Ala. 325, 34 So. 238 (1903) ; Sullivan Timber Co. v. Black, 159 Ala. 570,
48 So. 870 (1909) ; Boston Towboat Co. v. Medford Nat. Bank, 228 Mass. 484,
117 N. E. 928 (1917) ; Knott v. Evening Post Co., 124 Fed. 342 (C. C. W. D. Ky.
1903) ; (1928) 17 Ky. L. J. 54, pointing out that property held by corporation
before dissolution vests in stockholders subject to corporate liabilities; and in
interpreting the Kentucky statute authorizing a corporation to close up its
affairs on expiration of charter, it was held that no specific mode was described, nor was one at all desirable.
"Thomas v. Rogers, 191 N. C. 736, 133 S. E. 18 (1926) ; In re Friedman,
supra note 4; Loudermilk v. Butlert, 182 N. C. 502, 109 S. E. 571 (1921).
Refer to statutes of particular states: Bucklet v. Anderson, supra note 9; Sullivan Timber Co. v. Black, supra note 9.
'Refer to statutes of particular states: State v. New Orleans Debenture
Redemption Co., 107 La. 562, 32 So. 102 (1902).
McBride v. Murphy, 124 Atl. 198 (Del. Ch. 1924) ; also refer to statutes
of particular states.
' Baldwin v. Johnson, 95 Tex. 85, 65 S. W. 181 (1901); Capuccio v. Caire,
189 Cal. 154, 209 Pac. 367 (1922).
" N. C. Con. Stat. Ann. (1919), §1194.
"Heggie v. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 107 N. C. 581, 12 S. E. 275 (1890); Merchants Nat. Bank of Richmond v. Newton Cotton Mills, 115 N. C. 507, 20 S. E.
765 (1894) ; Holshouser v. Copper Co., 138 N. C. 248, 50 S. E. 650 (1905) ;
Hill v. Lumber Co., 113 N. C. 174, 18 S. E. 107 (1893) ; Loudermilk v. Butlert,
182 N. C. 502, 109 S. E. 571 (1921).
" Smith v. Dicks, supra note 1.

NOTES
corporate debts. 17 In accepting this view some courts lay down
varying limitations in that the title is held to vest in the stockholders
as tenants in common on conditions that no receiver is appointed, 18 or
there is no insolvency, 19 or creditors, 20 or that the property will be
subject to a "trust" for the benefit of creditors. 21 Still another holds
that, even though the debts have already been extinguished, title vests
in the stockholders only at the end of the statutory period for winding
up. 22 A few courts hold that title vests in the stockholders as a partnership, 23 while others use the terms "tenants in common" and "part24
nership" interchangeably.
By drawing an analogy to the situation upon the death intestate
of a natural person, one court 25 holds that even though a trustee be
appointed he would not hold the legal title to the property, but would
only be the custodian of the court with power of disposition, for the
purpose of paying debts and of distribution, his right being similar
to that of an administrator, legal title having "descended" to the stockholders. On the other hand, even courts firmly adhering to the
"trust-fund" doctrine, or to the tenancy in common theory, draw an
analogy to the situation where a natural person has died intestate. 2 6
In contradistinction to the holdings of decisions previously discussed, it is submitted that in those states providing for a winding-up
"'Capital Garage Co. v. Powell, 98 Vt. 145, 118 Atl. 524 (1922) ; Meredith
v. Washington Loan & Trust Co., 151 Md. 274, 134 Atl. 206 (1926); Shadoin
v. Sellars, 237 Ky. 751, 4 S. W. (2d) 717 (1928); Young v. Fitch, 181 Ky. 20,
206 S. W. 29 (1918); Taylor v. Interstate Investment Co., 75 Wash. 490, 135
Pac. 240 (1913) ; Montgomery v. Heath, 283 S. W. 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
" Cummington Realty Ass'n. v. Whitten, 238 Mass. 313, 132 N. E. 53 (1921) ;
Baldwin v. Johnson, supra note 13; Stone v. Edwards, 32 Ga. 479, 124 S. E.
54 (1924).
Baldwin v. Johnson, supra note 13.
Service & Wright Lumber Co. v. Sumpter Valley Ry. Co., 81 Ore. 32, 158
Pac. 175 (1916) ; Stone v. Edwards, supra note 18.
' Steams Coal & Lumber Co. v. Van Winkle et at, 221 Fed. 590 (E. D. Ky.
1915) ; Pioneer Coal Co. v. Asher, 210 Ky. 498, 276 S. W. 487 (1925).
"Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Van Winkle, supra note 21; Ewald Iron
Co. v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 692, 131 S. W. 774 (1910).
"Ewald Iron Co. v. Commonwealth, supra note 22.
' Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U. S. 50, 33 L. ed. 524 (1890).
"Stone
v. Edwards, supra note 18; see Service & Wright Lumber Co. v.
Sumter Valley Ry. Co., supra note 20.
"Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Van Winkle, supra note 21; Stone v. Edwards, 32 Ga. 479, 124 S. E. 54, 56, the court observing, "Oddly enough, but
more specifically, the relation of the stockholders to the assets of the dissolved
corporation is still more similar to the relation of a surviving husband or wife
to the real estate of a spouse who died intestate, leaving no lineal decendants";
Von Glahn v. DeRosset, 81 N. C. 472 (1879); Dobson v. Simonton, 86 N. C.
495 (1882) ; Wilson v. Leary, 120 N. C. 90, 26 S. E. 30 (1897).
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period no actual change of title takes place upon the expiration or
annullment of the corporate charter. The dying process is extended
for a fixed or reasonable period, wherein the corporation, though
nominally dead, still lives for the purpose of liquidation. Title to
property remains in the corporation, 27 the same as before its partial
legal death, subject to the winding-up proceedings. During this
period the stockholders are not tenants in common of the corporate
property, but have the same equitable interests as existed before the
charter's expiration. At the end of the period of extended existence,
in the absence of court action creating a receivership or trust, legal
title descends to the stockholders as tenants in common, in exactly
the same manner as title to realty vests in heirs upon death of a
natural person; and concurrence of each individual stockholder would
be necessary to convey his interest. 28 If debts still existed after such
"descent" of title, the property of the former corporation, now vested
in the stockholders as tenants in common, would be liable.
Regardless of which theory is adopted as to the place of title during dissolution, the practical results will be the same in that creditors
will always be protected, and a distribution made of any residue. But
it is submitted that the exigencies of modern business demand uniformity in the decisions, and the adoption of the simplest and most
practicable theory in order that disposition of interests in dead corporations may be facilitated, and proceedural difficulties avoided.
WALTER HOYLE.

SSee Duchutes Co. v. Lara, 127 Ore. 57, 270 Pac. 913 (1928), that corporation is capable of serving as repository of title during winding up period. In
Rossi v. Caire, 186 Cal. 544, 199 Pac. 1042 (1921), the court squarely faces
the question of "where is the title?" but refuses to answer, being content with
the statement that whether the interests of the stockholders be legal or equitable, it is a vested right which becomes absolute when the statutory trust of
the former directors or trustee of the dead corporation have been fulfilled,
there being no further claim necessitating the right of disposition of corporate

property in the trustees in order to insure satisfaction of creditors.
'See Capuccio v. Caire, 189 Cal. 514, 209 Pac. 367 (1922), that a revived
corporation could become vested with property of former dissolved corporation
only by means ofoeonveyances from all of stockholders of former corporation.

